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Abstract: High profile cases of exploitative labor practices have increased concerns over
agricultural working conditions. However, it is unclear whether and to what extent the
public is willing to trade-off fair working conditions for higher prices and food imports. We
implement a large-scale survey to uncover Greek consumer preferences for a food labeling
system that certifies fair working conditions for the workers employed at all production
stages of agricultural production. Empirical findings from several disciplines suggest that
results from contingent valuation surveys can be susceptible to hypothetical bias, social
desirability bias, and lack of consequentiality. To test these issues, we use the ‘cheap talk’
method (Kling et al., 2012), Lusk and Norwood’s (2009b) Inferred Valuation (IV) method and
the consequentiality scripts employed in Vossler and Evans (2009) and Vossler and Watson
(2013). We also test predictions of reference dependent theory by testing whether framing
the valuation question as an ‘Equivalent Loss’ (EL) differs from classical ‘Willingness-to-pay
elicitation’ (WTP). We collected responses from more than 3,800 consumers in the cities
of Athens and Ioannina in Greece. Our results show that neither the cheap talk nor the
consequentiality script had any effect on elicited valuations. In contrast, the IV method
∗Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics & Rural Development, Agricultural University of
Athens, Iera Odos 75, 11855, Greece, e-mail: adrihout@aua.gr.
†PhD candidate, Department of Agricultural Economics & Rural Development, Agricultural University
of Athens, Iera Odos 75, 11855, Athens, Greece, e-mail: avas@aua.gr.
‡Regents Professor and Willard Sparks Endowed Chair, Department of Agricultural Economics, Okla-
homa State University, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA, e-mail: jayson.lusk@okstate.edu.
§Professor and Tyson Endowed Chair, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Division
of Agriculture, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, AR 72701, USA, and Adjunct Professor, Norwegian
Agricultural Economics Research Institute and Korea University, e-mail: rnayga@uark.edu.
1
appears to mitigate social desirability bias. We also find that values elicited under WTP
are larger than values elicited under EL, which rejects neoclassical preferences. When social
desirability is taken out of our estimates, we find that consumers are willing to pay an average
premium of 72 cents/Kg for strawberries with fair labor certification, which is equivalent to
49% of current market prices.
Keywords: fair labor label; willingness to pay; equivalent loss; contingent valuation;
inferred valuation; consequentiality; cheap talk; uncertainty scale.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a surge of labor exploitation incidents in the Greek agricultural
farm sector. The most recent incident in April 2013 involved 33 Bangladeshi workers being
shot and injured by their supervisors at a strawberry farm as they protested for being unpaid
for several months. This incident brought mass media attention to the long-term issue of
labor exploitation in the agricultural farming sector. Subsequently, a steady stream of cases
of mistreatment and unfair working conditions in farm businesses have emerged, resulting in
public outcry in Greece and the European Union. Public anger was manifested by a strong
(albeit temporary) decline in the demand for strawberries. Despite the public backlash,
farmers have argued that in order to produce at prices that consumers are willing to pay,
and to be competitive with imported agricultural products, they cannot afford to provide
generous benefits for their employees (e.g., minimum wage, maximum working hours, sick
leave, housing). Without resorting to illegal employment practices, producers fear they will
be unable to profitably operate.
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate regarding the controversy about the trade-
offs between fair working conditions and the competitiveness of local agricultural products.
We use non-market valuation techniques designed to uncover the underlying preferences of
Greek consumers towards a food labeling system that certifies “fair” working conditions
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for the workers employed at all stages of agricultural production. Our aim is to under-
stand whether consumers’ alleged disapproval of unfair working practices is reflected in their
willingness-to-pay (WTP) a premium above regular prices of conventional agricultural prod-
ucts. Most relevant to our work is a labeling system that is already in place in the global
agro-food system known as Fair Trade (FT) labels.1 However, fair labor labeling is distinct
from fair trade labeling in that the later is mainly focused on commodities or products which
are typically exported from developing to developed countries and thus, is focused on helping
producers in developing countries.
Although previous research has studied ethically-related food marketing claims related to
animal welfare, environment, or fair trade, we are not aware of prior research that has focused
specifically on consumer preferences for agricultural employee pay and working conditions.
However, recent works by Howard and Allen (2006, 2010) and Hustvedt and Bernard (2010)
provide accumulated evidence in favor of labor-related information on a variety of products.
Using both hypothetical and non-hypothetical methods, the studies found that consumers
are willing to pay a premium for products, the production of which mandates subsistence
wages to all employees in the production chain. Our aim in this paper is to take this line of
research a step forward by introducing and testing labels that ensure not only subsistence
wages but also govern working hours, access to decent housing, and personal hygiene facilities
as well as health care services. Given that employment in Greek farms is mostly seasonal and
reliant on illegal immigrants who might have less recourse through traditional legal channels,
these additional conditions are likely aspects of an agro-food labor market that consumers
might find desirable.
To uncover consumers’ preferences for a fair labor certification system, this study uses
traditional stated preferences methods augmented with recent methodological advances in
the field designed to identify and weed out potential biases. We conducted a large scale ques-
tionnaire based experiment in two cities of Greece, Athens and Ioannina. We collected data
from personal interviews of more than 3,800 subjects. In addition to the empirical objective
related to fair labor labels, we also explore several methodological issues that are relevant
to nonmarket valuation, such as social desirability bias, hypothetical bias, consequentiality
of the survey, and certainty of responses. The next section describes the survey-experiment
and the relevant methodological issues we address.
1For a recent critical overview of the economic theory behind Fair Trade, see Dragusanu et al. (2014).
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2 The valuation survey-experiment and methodologi-
cal issues
The Contingent Valuation (CV) method has become one of the most popular methods to
measure WTP values for public and private goods, services, or amenities. Although it was
principally developed in environmental and transport economics, it has made considerable
headway in the valuation of food products over the last decades (e.g., Buzby et al., 1998;
Corsi, 2007). Most, if not all, CV studies are conducted in hypothetical contexts, particularly
in environmental valuation studies where a real market with salient payments is difficult to
establish (Carson, 2012; Haab et al., 2013; Kling et al., 2012).
The CVM involves creating a hypothetical valuation scenario in which consumers are
asked to state their WTP for the product in question. Empirical findings from several
disciplines suggest that results from the CVM can be susceptible to social desirability bias.
There are now several studies that show that when people are asked to predict other people’s
value, as in the Inferred Valuation method (discussed momentarily), they state a different
value than their own (e.g., Frederick, 2012; Kurt and Inman, 2013; Loewenstein and Adler,
1995; van Boven et al., 2000, 2003). Lusk and Norwood (2009b) used a modification of Levitt
and List’s (2007) additive utility model to illustrate how social desirability may carry over to
non-market valuation and produce inflated bids that misrepresent respondents’ preferences.
Their so called Inferred Valuation (IV) method, addresses social desirability bias by asking
respondents to state their beliefs about the average consumer’s valuation for a good.
Lusk and Norwood (2009a,b) argued that the IV method generates valuations that are
less likely to suffer from normative or moral response biases (such as social desirability bias),
and they found that responses to the IV method better predicted actual shopping behavior
than did those from a CV method. They also found that the IV method produced less
hypothetical bias when social desirability was present. The authors showed that goods with
normative dimensions are more prone to social desirability bias and thus the IV method is
more effective in bridging the gap between the laboratory and field valuations. In the spirit
of Lusk and Norwood (2009a,b), Pronin (2007) argues that people tend to recognize biases
in human judgment except when biases are their own, which implies that predictions over
other peoples’ preferences should mitigate biases.
Ever since the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (Arrow
et al., 1993) criticized the open-ended format as providing ‘erratic and biased’ responses, the
favored elicitation format in the CVM literature has been the dichotomous choice (DC)
format. Although other alternatives that were not considered by the NOAA panel were
later developed, Carson and Groves (2007) offer a typology of elicitation formats that shows
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that all formats can be seen as generalizations of the DC format. The DC format has been
favored due to its well known property of incentive compatibility. This is due to the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) which states that for the case of
more than two alternatives (i.e., non-DC formats), no non-dictatorial strategy-proof voting
procedure exists.2
This is to say that any response format with at least three possible outcomes is subject
to individual manipulation (i.e., it is not incentive compatible). This does not imply that
any binary DC format is incentive compatible but that, by elimination, only a DC format
could be incentive compatible assuming subjects believe that their response is consequential
(meaning there is some probability that the respondent’s answer will actually influence the
provision of the good).3 As we discuss in the next paragraph, the consequentiality of the
survey is a key condition in the assumption of incentive compatibility, and yet it is an issue
that has only lately recieved much attention.
Much of the early literature has evolved around the presumption that hypothetical bias
prevails in CV estimates (i.e., that people tend to state a higher WTP in hypothetical ques-
tions as opposed to non-hypothetical questions). As such, a number of approaches have been
proposed to reduce or elimate hypothetical bias. For example, the ‘cheap talk’ method has
been used to potentially reduce hypothetical bias by reminding participants of the tendency
among people to inflate their (hypothetical) valuations (Kling et al., 2012). As discussed
above, the issue of consequentiality has only been given attention in the last few years.
Carson and Groves (2007) argue that to produce useful information about an agent’s pref-
erences, survey results must be seen as potentially consequential. Under consequentiality,
survey respondents are explicitly told that their responses to preference questions will in-
fluence provision of the good under valuation. As a result of Carson and Groves’s (2007)
suggestion, the literature examining the merits of consequential surveys has been rapidly
growing (Carson et al., 2014; Herriges et al., 2010; List and Price, 2013; Mitani and Flo-
res, 2013; Poe and Vossler, 2011; Vossler et al., 2012; Vossler and Evans, 2009; Vossler and
Watson, 2013).
An additional challenge we face with this survey-experiment is the issue of reference-
dependent preferences. In the presence of information asymmetry, reference points may
2The theorem was formalized by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) and noted in passing by
Dummett and Farquharson (1961). See also Svensson and Reffgen (2014).
3While proponents of the DC format take this result about the incentive compatibility of the DC format
as granted for any type of good, Carson et al. (1997) show that the DC format is not incentive compatible
in the case of provision of a new private or quasi-public good. The incentive compatibility of the DC format
can be restored for quasi-public or private goods only if the binary choice is between two different forms of
the good, so that the valuation question represents a change in the good (Carson et al., 2001; Carson and
Groves, 2007).
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be formulated differently for each consumer and thus, heterogeneity in valuations may not
only reflect taste heterogeneity. In our context, for example, for the share of consumers
aware of labor exploitation in farms, the current endowment corresponds to products whose
production line entails undesirable practices. As such, the availability of certified alternatives
is seen as an opportunity to upgrade the (extrinsic) quality of goods they consume, at a cost
equal to the price premium of such alternatives. Clearly, this premium is better framed as
their willingness-to-pay (WTP), which is defined as the maximum amount a consumer would
be willing to pay in return for an increase (or upgrade) in his consumption for a good. This is
the valuation measure used in most studies eliciting homegrown values (e.g., Bateman et al.,
2000). On the other hand, there are uninformed consumers who think that currently available
goods are produced using fair labor practices and thus, according to their (wrong) perception,
the introduction of a certification system would induce an extra-cost for goods which are the
same with the ones they are already consuming. As a result, their valuation is better framed
as an ‘Equivalent loss’ (EL), defined as the maximum amount a consumer would be willing
to pay in place of a reduction (or downgrade) in her consumption of a good. Under Hicksian
preferences, these two valuation measures should be equal to each other (EL=WTP), since
ordering of consumption bundles is independent of individual’s endowment. However, if
preferences are formed as in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) reference-dependent theory,
this distinction is important. For this reason and to better approximate the average welfare
of fair labor labels we use both WTP and EL questions in a within-subjects basis.
Aside the empirical necessity for the use of both measures, their relative magnitude
from a methodological point of view is very interesting as well. In two competing hypoth-
esis regarding reference-dependent preferences, Munro and Sugden (2003), show how the
WTA/WTP gap is caused both by loss aversion in the good and by loss aversion in money.
This hypothesis is also verified by the results of Bateman et al. (1997) using experimental
markets and Bateman et al. (2000) using the CV method. On the other hand, Kahneman
et al. (1990) provide evidence of Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) original ‘no loss in buy-
ing’ (NLIB) hypothesis which states that buyers do not value the money they give up in a
transaction as a loss; that is money spent is not ‘coded’ as a loss. This is also confirmed in
Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) who firmed up the NLIB hypothesis by proposing a theory
of the conditions under which the gains and losses associated with a transaction are mentally
integrated prior to evaluation, rather than being evaluated separately. They propose that
when a loss and an equal and opposite gain are integrated in this way, painful perceptions
of loss do not arise. Because consumers normally have budget reserves, that is, reserves of
money that are available for unanticipated spending, when faced an opportunity to buy a
good and when they are able to finance this spending from their budget reserve, gains and
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losses are integrated. As a result, the money that has to be spent to buy the good is already
seen as a token for unspecified goods and thus money outlays are not perceived as losses. In
contrast, if the individual faces an unanticipated buying opportunity which she can finance
only by forgoing some specific consumption plan, the act of buying involves a definite loss,
separable from the gain; and so the money payment is perceived as a loss. A subsequent
adversarial collaboration paper of Bateman et al. (2005) however, provides evidence that the
cost of buying is indeed subject to loss aversion.
In our specific application normalizing the utility of gains to zero, if preferences are refer-
ence dependent in the form of Munro and Sugden (2003), then we should observe EL≥WTP
(for example, see Bateman et al., 2000, for a proof), irrespective of whether downgrading
in EL is perceived as a loss or not.4 On the other hand, if the NLIB hypothesis is true,
then there are three different competing scenarios about the relative magnitude of WTP and
EL. In the first scenario when money spent to avoid the downgrade is covered by budget
reserves (as in WTP) and thus is not perceived as a loss, EL is greater or equal to WTP
(EL≥WTP) notwithstanding the loss perceptions in EL treatments. In the other two sce-
narios, the cost of avoiding the downgrade as well as the downgrade per se are perceived as
losses in EL and as such we expect EL≥ (≤)WTP when losses in the money (good) domain
are weighted more heavily than equi-util losses in the other dimension. In conclusion, while
EL>WTP is indicative of reference-dependent preferences with or without NLIB, EL<WTP
is supportive of the NLIB hypothesis. We test for these competing hypotheses in our survey
by framing the valuation questions either as a WTP or as an EL. Next section describes the
experimental design we adopt to test the hypotheses described above.
3 Experimental design and questionnaire development
To elicit valuations for the fair labor certification system, we chose a pack of 500gr of
strawberries as our product of interest. This was our chosen product for a number of reasons.
First, we needed a product which is widely consumed and would appeal to most consumers.
Second, we wanted a product that can be sold in packages that could carry a labeling
certification system; strawberries can and are often sold in a packaged form. Third, the
production process of strawberries is a (manual) labor intensive process (labor contributes
to 45-50% of total cost of strawberries (Poinssot, 2013)).
All subjects were first informed about the fair labor certification system. Because there
4Normalizing the utility of gains to zero assumes that there is no “extra kick” from gaining a good,
other than its consumption utility. This is the original and the most commonly used formulation of prospect
theory for riskless choices.
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was the chance that subjects were familiar with a ‘fair trade’ label that could confound their
perception of a ‘fair labor’ label, we wanted to make sure that all subjects would be actually
valuing a ‘fair labor’ label by providing them a script with relevant information for fair labor
labeling (the script can be found in Appendix A).
To answer the methodological issues we raised in the previous section, we adopted a de-
sign with elements of a within- as well as a between-subjects design (Charness et al., 2012).
For the between-subjects design we adopted a 4 × 2 design where we vary the scripts ac-
companying the valuation questions (control (no scripts) vs. cheap talk vs. consequentiality
vs. cheap talk & consequentiality) as well as the elicited valuation measure (equivalent loss
vs. willingness to pay). The five bid amounts used for the Discrete Choice format (20 cents
vs. 40 cents vs. 70 cents vs. 100 cents vs. 120 cents) were selected based on projected
historical prices of strawberries as well as feedback we received from the pilot survey (see
Appendix C for a discussion of selection of bid amounts). The bid amounts were varied on
a between subject basis so that each subject was asked for his/her valuation at only one bid
amount. Table 1 shows our experimental design and the per treatment number of subjects.
Valuations were elicited using the CV method as well as the IV method on a within subjects
basis. The order was counterbalanced.
Table 1: Experimental design
Equivalent Loss Willingness to pay
Bid amount 20 40 70 100 120 20 40 70 100 120 Total
IV
then
CV
Control 46 47 47 47 47 51 50 49 49 48 481
Consequentiality 44 47 47 47 47 48 47 48 48 48 471
Cheap talk 47 47 47 47 47 48 47 47 47 48 472
Cheap talk &
Consequentiality
47 47 47 47 47 49 48 48 48 48 476
CV
then
IV
Control 48 48 48 49 46 50 49 49 49 49 485
Consequentiality 46 47 47 46 48 50 49 49 50 49 481
Cheap talk 46 47 47 47 47 49 49 49 49 49 479
Cheap talk &
Consequentiality
47 47 47 48 48 49 48 48 49 49 480
Total 371 377 377 378 377 394 387 387 389 388 3825
Notes: CV stands for Contingent valuation; IV stands for Inferred Valuation.
The cheap talk script was compiled from several sources as well as our own previous work
(e.g., Bulte et al., 2005; Lusk, 2003) and reads as follows:
“In a minute you’ll be asked whether you are willing to pay a certain amount
for strawberries.
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This question will be hypothetical, that is, you will not actually have to pay.
In general, people experience difficulties in answering hypothetical questions.
They often state they are willing to pay an amount larger than the amount they
are willing to pay in reality.
One reason why this happens is because when the time comes to actually
make the payment, they also consider that this money won’t be available for
other purchases. Therefore, when the question is hypothetical, it is easier to
exaggerate their response.
Before answering the willingness to pay question, try to think whether you
are really willing to pay this amount for strawberries and that this amount will
no longer be available for other purchases.”
The consequentiality script was adopted from Vossler and Watson (2013) and Vossler
and Evans (2009) and reads as follows:
“We would like to inform you that the survey results will become available to
producers, traders and retailers of agricultural products as well as to the wider
general public of consumers. This means that this survey could affect the decision
of producers, traders and retailers to adopt a Fair Labor certification system for
strawberries as well as the average price of strawberries.”
After the script(s) was(were) read, the valuation questions followed. In the control (no
script) treatment, the valuation treatments followed right after information about the fair
labor label was given. The willingness to pay valuation measure was framed as:
“Assume you are given a pack of half a kilo of conventional strawberries
without any certification [show picture 2]. Would you be willing to pay XX cents
so that you can exchange it with a similar pack of strawberries certified with a
fair labor label [show picture 3]?”5
Conversely, the equivalent loss measure was framed as:
“Assume you are given a pack of half a kilo of strawberries certified with a
fair labor label [show picture 3]. Would you be willing to pay XX cents so that
you can avoid exchanging it with a pack of conventional strawberries without
any certification? [show picture 2]”
Following the literature on certainty scales (Champ et al., 1997; Morrison and Brown,
2009), every CV discrete choice question was followed by a question asking respondents to
5The pictures can be found in Appendix B.
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state how certain they were about their response on a 10-point scale anchored with the labels
“Not certain at all” and “Very certain” .
Similar to the CV questions, the IV questions were formatted to elicit the willingness to
pay measure:
“Assume that an average consumer is given a pack of half a kilo of conventional
strawberries without any certification [show picture 2]. Do you think s/he would
be willing to pay XX cents so that s/he can exchange it with a similar pack of
strawberries certified with a fair labor label [show picture 3]?”
or the equivalent loss valuation measure:
“Assume that an average consumer is given a pack of half a kilo of strawberries
certified with a fair labor label [show picture 3]. Do you think s/he would be
willing to pay XX cents so that s/he can avoid exchanging it with a pack of
conventional strawberries without any certification? [show picture 2]”
A consequentiality question was also included to allow us to test for differences between
respondents with different consequentiality perceptions of the survey. The question was
adopted from Vossler and Watson (2013) and Vossler et al. (2012). Participants had to
indicate the indirect consequences of the survey on a five point likert scale anchored by “not
at all” and “very much”. The question was framed as:
“To what extent do you believe that your answers in this survey will be taken
into account by producers, traders and retailers?”
The questionnaire also elicited respondents’ beliefs about the likelihood of hypothetical
bias and social desirability bias (using the social desirability scale (SDS) of Sto¨ber (2001)).
Recently, research in the area of non-market valuation has identified political affiliation and
means of provision of the good i.e., privately or collectively, as a determinant of willingness
to pay for public goods (e.g., Dupont and Bateman, 2012). This mainly originates from
a body of research that has found significant differences in the degree of concern for en-
vironmental goods expressed by individuals with different political affiliations. While our
valuation exercise does not concern a public good, aspects of the fair labor label may appeal
to political ideology e.g., the minimum wage provision. Therefore, a political ideology ques-
tion was included which we adopted from the European Social Survey. A set of demographic
questions on age, gender, education, household size and perceived income position of the
household was also asked as well as questions related to respondents’ price sensitivity with
respect to grocery shopping and purchase frequency of strawberries.
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4 Data collection methods
A pilot questionnaire was pre-tested in February-March 2014 in the city of Athens with
160 subjects, after which several adjustments were made. The full scale survey was then
launched on April 1, 2014 and questionnaires were filled in until June 11, 2014. The period
of data collection was mainly dictated by the fact that strawberries are mainly traded during
April, May and early June. Consumers were randomly intercepted in front of the main
entrance of various supermarkets. In all, 11,510 subjects were intercepted in the cities of
Athens and Ioannina and 3,825 agreed to take part in the survey resulting in a cooperation
rate of 33.23%. Of course, several subjects walked out during an interview or opted not
to respond to certain questions, which further reduced the available number of subjects for
statistical analysis.
Regarding the demographic profile of our sample, Table 2 shows that the vast majority
of respondents were females (66.36%). This is not as problematic as it may seem given
that the primary shoppers in Greece, as in many other countries, are typically females.
For example, one study estimates that 75% of principal household shoppers in the US are
females (Mediamark Research and Intelligence, 2009). Therefore, the gender composition
of our sample is not representative of the population of the two cities but it might better
represent the grocery shopping population. Since we also asked respondents to report on the
age and gender composition of their household, we can also compare the demographic profile
of respondents’ households with that of the 2001 census (which is the latest available census
for which basic demographic information are available). The comparison (see Table 2) shows
that discrepancies with the 2001 census are small.
Table 2: Comparison of gender and age groups between survey respondents, their household
members and the 2001 census (percentages)
Males 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 ≥70
Respondents 33.64 0.00 3.47 24.07 22.37 23.50 17.29 7.13 2.18
Households 48.24 8.22 11.89 20.77 15.39 16.61 16.96 7.05 3.03
Census 48.45 9.22 11.46 16.37 16.06 14.54 11.93 10.45 9.96
5 Data analysis and results
As in every experiment, it is critical to explore whether randomization to treatment
was successful by testing if the observable characteristics are balanced across the between
subjects treatments. Table 3 shows the basic descriptive statistics for a set of observable
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characteristics. With respect to demographic variables, there is no significant difference
between treatments for gender (Pearson’s χ2 = 5.132, p-value=0.644), education (Pear-
son’s χ2 = 20.168, p-value=0.979), income (Pearson’s χ2 = 39.326, p-value=0.076), age
(Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 5.599, p-value=0.587) and household size (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 3.341,
p-value=0.852).
We also find no difference between treatments with respect to the Social Desirability score
(Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 6.128, p-value=0.525), political ideology (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 8.036,
p-value=0.329), purchase frequency of strawberries (Pearson’s χ2 = 30.800, p-value=0.671),
price sensitivity in purchasing decisions (Pearson’s χ2 = 22.302, p-value=0.767), perceived
likelihood of hypothetical bias for the respondent (Pearson’s χ2 = 31.952, p-value=0.276)
and perceived likelihood of hypothetical bias for other respondents (Pearson’s χ2 = 23.605,
p-value=0.702). Thus, we can safely conclude that the randomization to treatment on a
wide set of observable characteristics was successful.
5.1 Descriptive data analysis
Before we proceed with the econometric analysis we can gain interesting insights by
looking at the raw data. Figure 1 graphs the percentage of Yes/No responses elicited with
the CV method in the discrete choice question for each of the four script treatments. Two
observations are noteworthy. First, it appears that in all treatments, the elicited values
are responsive to prices (bid amounts); we observe a decline of ‘yes’ responses when the
bid amount increases. The 40 cents bid yields statistically significantly lower proportion
of ‘Yes’ responses as compared to the 20 cent bid (p-value<0.001); the 70 cent bid yields
significantly lower responses than the 40 cent bid (p-value=0.001); the 100 cent bid is also
lower and statistically different than the 70 cent bid (p-value=0.015) while the 120 cent bid
does not differ with respect to the 100 cent bid (p-value=0.829). In addition, a significant
percentage of subjects states a high value for the fair labor certification label even when the
bid is up to 120 cents. This is interesting since the amount of 120 cents represents a 171%
increase in the price of strawberries (with respect to a price of 70 cents/500 gr).
Second, it appears that the different scripts are not effective in changing response patterns
with respect to the control (no script) treatment. This is confirmed by proportion tests where
we find that the proportion of ‘Yes’ responses in the Control treatment is not significantly
different from the Consequentiality script treatment (p-value=0.225); or the Cheap talk
script treatment (p-value=0.720); or the Cheap talk & Consequentiality script treatment
(p-value=0.082).
Figure 2 graphs the proportion of responses in the discrete choice question for the IV
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Table 3: Descriptives statistics of subjects’ observable characteristics
Variable name and description Variable levels N Mean S.D.
Gender: Male dummy 3763 0.34 0.47
Age 3721 39.97 13.77
Hsize: Household size 3708 3.40 1.25
Shopper: Dummy for major grocery
shopper
3754 0.78 0.41
SDS: Social Desirability Scale 3636 11.35 2.68
Political: Political ideology scale 3312 4.66 2.14
Educ: Education level
Up to primary school
3708
3.61%
Up to Junior Hi-school 4.75%
Up to Senior Hi-school 22.92%
Some college or university stu-
dent
21.90%
University graduate 37.30%
Post-graduate studies 9.52%
Income: Household’s economic
position
Bad or Very bad
3702
5.73%
Below average 11.16%
Average 47.41%
Above average 19.75%
Good or Very good 15.96%
HBiasOwn: Perceived likelihood of
hypothetical bias for the
respondent
Not likely at all
3725
40.70%
Unlikely 31.03%
Neither likely, nor unlikely 15.09%
Likely 11.49%
Very likely 1.69%
HBiasOther: Perceived likelihood of
hypothetical bias for other
respondents
Not likely at all
3709
4.26%
Unlikely 20.22%
Neither likely, nor unlikely 32.27%
Likely 33.67%
Very likely 9.57%
PurchFreq: Purchase frequency
(when strawberries are available)
Never
3707
14.32%
Once a month 25.06%
2-3 times a month 21.12%
Once a week 28.16%
2-3 times a week 9.55%
More than 2-3 times a week 1.78%
PriceSens: Price sensitivity
Not important at all
3695
1.14%
Not important 3.82%
Neither important, nor unim-
portant
15.21%
Important 42.14%
Very important 37.70%
Notes: S.D. stands for standard deviation. For variables with levels, the percentage of each level
is denoted instead of the mean. For each variable the sample was restricted to observations for
which subjects gave responses to both the CV and IV methods.
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Figure 1: Percentage of Yes/No responses in the CVM per treatment
method. The findings are similar to those in the CV method: we find no effect of the scripts
on responses (p-value=0.285, 0.413 and 0.866 when we compare the Control treatment with
the Cheap talk script, Consequentiality script and Cheap talk & Consequentiality script
treatments, respectively). In addition, while proportion of ‘Yes’ responses declines for the
first two bid amounts, it is flat after 70 cents. Proportion tests indicate that the 40 cents bid
amount yields a significantly lower proportion of ‘Yes’ responses when compared with the
20 cents bid (p-value<0.001), while the 70 cents bid yields lower ‘Yes’ proportion than the
40 cents bid (p-value<0.001). However, the 100 cents and 120 cents do not yield different
responses when compared with the 70 cents bid (p-value=0.443 and 0.672, respectively).
What is even more interesting is that the IV method seems to work as advertised. Fig-
ure 2 shows that for all bid amounts, the IV method yields a significantly lower proportion of
‘Yes’ responses when compared with CV method shown in Figure 1. Proportion tests show
that differences are highly significant for all bid amounts (p-values<0.001 in all cases). The
difference in the proportion of ‘Yes’ is larger than 30% for all bid amounts. This is an indica-
tion that the IV method was effective in mitigating social desirability and hypothetical bias.
Thus, valuations from the IV method may be more valid for predicting market outcomes.
Figures 3 and 4 compare the elicited value measures (Equivalent loss vs. Willingness
to pay) for the CV and IV methods, respectively. It is obvious that since the proportion
of ‘Yes’ responses is higher for WTP than EL, then it is implied that values elicited under
WTP are larger than values elicited under EL. Proportions tests confirm the insight that
the proportion of ‘Yes’ for WTP is larger than EL under the CV method (p-value=0.017)
14
Figure 2: Percentage of Yes/No responses in the IVM per treatment
and under the IV method (p-value<0.001).
5.2 Econometric analysis
To check whether the results obtained above hold under conditional analysis, we esti-
mated interval regression models with clustered standard errors at the individual level to
account for the fact that each person provided responses under both CV and IV meth-
ods. Table 4 shows coefficient estimates from several specifications. Model (1) is our basic
specification where only the treatment variables are included in the regression. We confirm
that none of the scripts (Cheap talk, Consequentiality or their combination) has any effect
on elicited valuations. On the other hand, the IV dummy is highly significant indicating
that subjects under the IV method are stating lower valuations, which is a likely indication
that this method successfully mitigates social desirability and hypothetical bias. The WTP
dummy is also highly significant indicating that elicited valuations are higher when the val-
uation question is framed as a WTP question rather than as an EL question. Our result
supports Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) ‘no loss in buying’ hypothesis which states that
buyers do not value the money they give up in a transaction as a loss. Finally, there is evi-
dence of significant order effects indicating that when the IV question was asked first, then
subjects tended to align their response in the CV question. This could be due to the fact
that answering the IV valuation question first and the CV question second, made subjects
think of their own biases.
15
Figure 3: Percentage of Yes/No responses in the CVM per value measure
Figure 4: Percentage of Yes/No responses in the IVM per value measure
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As we have discussed in previous sections, recent literature has argued that consequen-
tiality is needed for incentive compatibility. We therefore explore differences in results for
people who believe and do not believe their answers are consequential. Based on the five
point Likert consequentiality question, we divided subjects into ‘consequential’ and ‘incon-
sequential’. We defined the consequential sample as involving subjects that stated that they
believed their answers will be taken into account by producers, traders and retailers on a
medium or higher likelihood (3 or more on the 5-point Likert scale). The inconsequential
sample was defined as those that perceived that the survey would have little or no effect to
producers, traders and retailers.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 show estimates from the consequential and inconsequential
subsamples, respectively. The results are roughly similar with those from the full sample with
one exception. A few script treatment variables are now statistically significant (albeit only
at the 10% level). However, this not is not likely a robust result. Table A1 in Appendix D
shows estimates of the consequential and inconsequential subsamples with the addition of
demographic and attitudinal variables in the list of independent variables. As evident, the
script treatment variables are no longer statistically significant. Thus, we conclude that
there are no differential effects with respect to the script treatment variables between the
subsamples.
A final piece of robustness check for our results comes from certainty corrections. Fol-
lowing previous literature (Morrison and Brown, 2009), we recoded the ‘Yes’ responses in
the CV question using a rating of 7 in the certainty question as the cut-off. Columns (4),
(5) and (6) in Table 4 present coefficients for the full sample as well as the consequential
and inconsequential subsamples, respectively. None of our conclusions changes. The only
difference we observe with the addition of demographics (estimates are shown in Table A1 in
the Appendix D) is that for the inconsequential subsample, framing of the valuation question
does not matter i.e., we observe that willingness to pay equals equivalent loss.
We can then proceed in graphing the aggregate demand curves for strawberries with
fair labor certification. Figure 5 does exactly that for valuations elicited with CV and
IV. Given that IV mitigates social desirability bias, it would be advisable for producers
and retailers to base their marketing decisions on the IV curve. Each point on this curve
indicates the percentage of respondents that would buy half a kilo of strawberries with fair
labor certification at the premium projected on the Y axis. The fact that the IV curve
intersects the X axis indicates that a percentage of consumers would not buy strawberries
with fair labor certification even when these are offered at no premium at all.
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Figure 5: Aggregate demand curves for the CV and IV elicitation methods
6 Conclusions and discussion
There have been increasing calls around the world for urgent action to tackle widespread
abuse of migrant workers in the agri-food sector. This paper sought to contribute to the
debate regarding the controversy about the trade-offs between fair working conditions and
the competitiveness of local agricultural products. To do so, we used a Contingent Valuation
survey designed to uncover the underlying preferences of Greek consumers towards a food
labeling system that certifies fair working conditions for the workers employed at all produc-
tion stages of agricultural products. In addition to this important empirical objective, we
also examined several methodological issues i.e, how we can mitigate hypothetical bias, so-
cial desirability bias and lack of consequentiality. We also examined predictions of reference
dependent theory by testing whether framing the valuation question as an ‘Equivalent Loss’
(EL) differs from classical ‘Willingness-to-pay’ elicitation.
While the IV method worked as advertised and was successful in mitigating social de-
sirability bias, none of the scripts we employed (i.e., cheap talk, consequentiality and their
combination) had any effect on elicited valuations. This is surprising given that there is now
a well established literature which has identified cheap talk scripts as effective in mitigat-
ing hypothetical bias (e.g., Lusk, 2003; Morrison and Brown, 2009; O¨zdemir et al., 2009).
Similarly, consequentiality has emerged as an important addition to standard CV studies
(Vossler and Evans, 2009; Vossler and Watson, 2013). One way to interpret our non-result
from the evaluation of these two scripts is that using scripts from previous studies is not a
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panacea that will work in every single study. More research is needed to further test the
effectiveness of the cheap talk and consequentiality scripts in reducing hypothetical bias in
different contexts.
Our results also show that values elicited under WTP are larger than values elicited under
EL, which supports Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) ‘no loss in buying’ hypothesis which
states that buyers do not value the money they give up in a transaction as a loss. When social
desirability is taken out of our estimates, we find that consumers are willing to pay an average
premium of 72 cents/Kg of strawberries with fair labor certification, which is equivalent to
49% of current market prices. This can be valuable information for producers and retailers
that seek to differentiate their products and are wondering whether costs associated with
product differentiation can be recouped from potential customers. All in all, our study
provides the first economic estimates in the literature of premiums associated with fair labor
certification and shows that while fair labor certification is a road not yet taken, it might
carry significant benefits for crop laborers, producers and consumers. The positive premiums
that our respondents are willing to pay suggest that people are aware of fair labor issues and
value the better treatment of workers in the agricultural sector.
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A Questionnaire scripts
Information for the fair labor informational script was compiled from three relevant to
the fair labor label websites: an auditing non-profit organization that formally measures and
accredits best employment practices (http://www.fairworkingconditions.ie), the fair
labor association (http://www.fairlabor.org) and the Food Alliance certification pro-
gramme (http://foodalliance.org). The script read like this:
“The Fair Labor label [show picture 1]6 can be certified by various organi-
zations like the Fair Working Conditions.ie which is a non-profit international
organization that aims in recognizing and improving employment conditions.
Such a label ensures that the product is produced in a business farm that strictly
follows the standards set by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). These
standards concern the maximum number of working hours per week, the legal
compensation and labor benefits required by state law for each activity sector
as well as workers’ hygiene conditions in their working place. In addition, the
standards prohibit child labor and bind the employer for no discrimination on
the basis of race, nationality, or any other criteria.”
B Pictures
6The picture can be found in Appendix B.
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C Selection of bid amounts
To select the bid amounts for the discrete choice valuation question, we first examined
historical data for strawberries from the Athens Central Market Organization S.A. which is
one of the major markets for vegetable and meat wholesalers in Greece.7 The historical data
show that the bulk of strawberry sales takes place between April and May (smaller quantities
of strawberries are also traded in February, March and June) which also determined the data
collection period of our survey-experiment. A simple linear projection of strawberry prices
with data from April 2008 to May 2013, projected an average mode price for April-May
2014 at e1.458/Kg. This is remarkably close to the realized average mode price for April-
May 2014 at e1.465/Kg. Given that our valuation product was selected to be a pack of
500gr of strawberries (corresponding projected price is e0.73/500 gr) and that the valuation
question concerned an upgrade (or downgrade, depending on the elicited valuation measure),
we decided that our price range would center around e0.70 taking also into account feedback
from a pilot survey. Therefore, the full price range was selected as: 20 cents, 40 cents, 70
cents, 100 cents and 120 cents.
D Additional tables
7The Athens Central Market Organization S.A. (http://www.okaa.gr/) is a public organization super-
vised by the Ministry of Rural Development and Food. It serves as an organized host of about 600 vegetable
and meat wholesalers and operates in an area of about 26 hectares.
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Table A1: Interval regression estimates (with demo-
graphics)
Without certainty correction With certainty correction
Full sample Consequential Incosequential Full sample Consequential Incosequential
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cheap talk -10.004 -5.011 -17.604∗ 0.821 -5.425 1.569
(8.860) (15.423) (10.702) (9.798) (17.018) (11.609)
Consequentiality 10.541 24.280 -0.598 11.285 20.808 1.586
(8.969) (15.901) (10.878) (10.024) (17.543) (11.966)
Cheap talk &
Consequentiality
-3.782 10.789 -14.183 -7.098 -3.562 -10.973
(8.732) (15.578) (10.588) (9.755) (16.952) (11.698)
IV -163.861∗∗∗ -205.998∗∗∗ -142.361∗∗∗ -140.506∗∗∗ -172.517∗∗∗ -122.545∗∗∗
(14.479) (31.089) (15.618) (13.978) (29.054) (14.975)
WTP 23.825∗∗∗ 41.896∗∗∗ 11.616 18.416∗∗ 27.435∗∗ 10.848
(6.693) (12.883) (7.751) (7.263) (12.997) (8.493)
Order -36.990∗∗∗ -49.069∗∗∗ -34.703∗∗∗ -37.587∗∗∗ -55.205∗∗∗ -31.051∗∗∗
(6.997) (13.214) (8.305) (7.789) (15.114) (8.940)
Age -0.948∗∗∗ -0.955∗ -0.902∗∗∗ -1.121∗∗∗ -1.096∗ -1.156∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.518) (0.350) (0.331) (0.569) (0.400)
Gender -4.828 0.318 -0.649 15.971∗∗ 28.206∗ 14.860
(7.031) (12.669) (8.217) (7.886) (14.641) (9.122)
Educ2 17.138 18.658 16.325 14.099 12.989 11.823
(24.906) (42.467) (31.642) (28.015) (46.094) (37.424)
Educ3 22.888 45.385 20.961 44.864
∗ 57.529 50.681
(20.094) (35.509) (25.000) (23.264) (39.315) (30.831)
Educ4 -2.374 1.097 2.225 12.215 10.420 22.907
(20.756) (35.807) (25.761) (23.849) (39.362) (31.442)
Educ5 10.546 13.154 18.559 34.418 25.665 51.631
∗
29
(19.871) (34.460) (24.845) (23.050) (37.975) (30.769)
Educ6 -10.343 -36.998 14.466 13.599 -5.048 35.946
(21.892) (38.326) (26.859) (25.070) (41.656) (32.556)
Hsize -1.189 -4.211 -0.449 -4.157 -8.670∗ -2.570
(2.642) (4.549) (3.333) (2.933) (5.165) (3.635)
Shopper -1.481 0.915 -4.325 14.531 18.820 11.093
(8.195) (14.532) (9.920) (9.280) (16.515) (10.983)
Political -0.130 3.786 -4.183∗∗ -0.676 0.624 -3.369
(1.485) (2.582) (1.903) (1.649) (2.818) (2.077)
SDS 8.564∗∗∗ 3.314 9.657∗∗∗ 8.715∗∗∗ 3.663 9.626∗∗∗
(1.480) (2.452) (1.790) (1.655) (2.680) (1.962)
HBiasOhter2 41.399
∗∗ 64.628∗∗ 20.406 36.005∗ 43.424 28.834
(18.235) (32.145) (22.881) (19.814) (33.933) (24.948)
HBiasOther3 33.055
∗ 58.042∗ 14.626 35.856∗ 44.954 31.412
(17.669) (31.311) (22.280) (19.396) (33.467) (24.416)
HBiasOther4 29.447
∗ 57.144∗ 12.700 28.698 43.656 24.022
(17.713) (31.582) (22.148) (19.375) (33.774) (24.152)
HBiasOther5 9.804 -1.102 18.791 14.273 -0.802 32.416
(19.516) (34.341) (24.331) (21.541) (37.612) (26.784)
HBiasOwn2 -5.541 -13.870 2.963 -26.309
∗∗∗ -34.250∗∗ -19.393∗
(7.758) (13.870) (9.184) (8.863) (16.034) (10.173)
HBiasOwn3 8.750 -14.284 19.246 -30.684
∗∗∗ -62.211∗∗∗ -16.515
(9.863) (16.892) (12.584) (11.551) (21.505) (13.974)
HBiasOwn4 2.014 -10.565 4.007 -32.871
∗∗ -51.727∗∗ -29.075∗
(11.196) (18.890) (14.243) (12.773) (22.386) (16.142)
HBiasOwn5 17.096 65.579 -1.705 -30.925 -28.955 -31.736
(26.693) (54.842) (28.976) (30.060) (57.151) (33.699)
PurchFreq2 66.967
∗∗∗ 58.716∗∗∗ 62.158∗∗∗ 57.650∗∗∗ 42.351∗ 54.762∗∗∗
(11.784) (21.651) (13.129) (12.889) (23.244) (14.322)
PurchFreq3 57.546
∗∗∗ 48.908∗∗ 48.179∗∗∗ 64.985∗∗∗ 63.732∗∗∗ 47.580∗∗∗
(11.773) (21.250) (13.327) (13.473) (24.425) (14.641)
PurchFreq4 66.355
∗∗∗ 66.010∗∗∗ 49.550∗∗∗ 82.640∗∗∗ 87.036∗∗∗ 59.126∗∗∗
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(11.825) (21.826) (12.960) (13.899) (25.617) (14.526)
PurchFreq5 88.770
∗∗∗ 91.399∗∗∗ 58.107∗∗∗ 106.687∗∗∗ 100.539∗∗∗ 81.619∗∗∗
(15.408) (26.859) (18.588) (17.666) (29.910) (20.791)
PurchFreq6 94.388
∗∗∗ 96.559∗∗ 75.980∗ 107.096∗∗∗ 131.162∗∗∗ 49.077
(28.220) (44.987) (39.386) (30.715) (49.688) (40.203)
PriceSens2 8.923 21.046 -9.842 29.847 -9.308 20.800
(32.211) (71.787) (33.943) (34.888) (71.897) (36.145)
PriceSens3 3.648 0.217 -6.608 21.922 -62.093 39.871
(28.887) (67.031) (29.036) (31.215) (66.855) (31.160)
PriceSens4 -9.928 -2.609 -26.281 11.562 -61.979 24.230
(28.181) (66.145) (27.967) (30.397) (65.830) (29.716)
PriceSens5 -23.441 -25.563 -32.436 1.074 -72.295 15.345
(28.448) (66.414) (28.386) (30.576) (66.249) (29.964)
Athens -4.480 5.315 -6.847 1.416 9.175 1.716
(6.906) (12.287) (8.323) (7.605) (13.456) (9.039)
Constant 71.128 156.537 71.715 -11.753 185.207∗ -59.218
(46.364) (95.490) (52.442) (51.182) (99.767) (58.645)
ln(σ) 5.105∗∗∗ 5.344∗∗∗ 4.902∗∗∗ 5.195∗∗∗ 5.431∗∗∗ 4.972∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.147) (0.106) (0.096) (0.164) (0.117)
N 6346 3416 2930 6346 3416 2930
AIC 7405.604 3863.316 3437.730 7889.676 4252.824 3532.210
BIC 7655.561 4090.356 3659.092 8139.632 4479.864 3753.573
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
31
